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ABSTRACT 
In Indonesia, shrimp pond development and shrimp production expended significantly. There are 
also signs that this expansion has caused an environmental damaged, especially on the existence 
on mangrove forest. This extensification or expansion process has been facilitated by the national 
government through various support programs. Another important factor affecting the shrimp 
production  and  trade  is  the  rising  demand  in  EU  and  US  for  sustainable  marine  products, 
especially  shrimp  production  and  related  products.  The  rising  environmental  awareness  in 
Europe and US about the environmental impact of shrimp ponds in producer countries likely to 
put pressure on shrimp producing countries such as Indonesia. The "idea" of green shrimp has 
arrived in the area, but it is not passively adopted and implemented. It is being "negotiated" and 
translated into local concepts according to local stakeholder goals and strategies. This paper aims  
to analyze actors goals and strategies and understand what the "reality" of green shrimp trade in 
the area is. These above processes are illustrated with case study material from Tarakan, East 
Kalimantan, Indonesia.  
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Introduction  
 
The rising awareness in Europe and US about the environmental impact of shrimp ponds in 
producer countries has created a new ‘battlefield of quality’ [1] at is placing increased pressure 
on producing countries such as Indonesia to demonstrate their sustainability [2]. The “idea of 
sustainable or green shrimp has been developed over recent years through several standards and 
certification targeting practices from the pond to processing level. But contrary to the apolitical, 
managerial language of sustainability standards [3, 4], certification processes are not passively 
adopted and implemented. Instead, they create what Anna Tsing [5] has labeled ‘friction’, a 
negotiated process whereby global norms, knowledge and policy goals are translated, and as 
such transformed, into local knowledge and practices according to local stakeholder goals and 
strategies. This paper provides an ‘thick’ analysis of the practices and strategies of various chain 
actors with the aim of understanding how global environmental governance goals, through the 
mechanism of standards and certification,  are translated into local realities of shrimp trade and 
production. In particular, we focus on three related processes – government, NGO and artisanal 
trade as three distinct but interrelated regulatory networks. 
 
The shrimp industry of Indonesia is representative of the attempts made to negotiate access to 
international markets by seeking quality assurance through standards and certification. with the 
decline of coastal shrimp fisheries, the culture of Penaeid shrimp has emerged as one of the most 
important export commodities in the country, providing a particularly important source of export IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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revenue and employment to isolated coastal regions of the archipelago [6, 7]. At the same time, 
coastal shrimp aquaculture has proven a high risk activity, with disease and the extensification of 
production leading to mangrove deforestation and declining returns for farmers [8, 9, 10]. Faced 
with  increasing  pressure  from  international  civil  society,  consumers  and  retailers  alike,  the 
government and industry in Indonesia has responded by exploring market-based standards as a 
means of demonstrating improved production safety and quality – including sustainability [11] 
 
The  proliferation  of  state  and  non-state  standards,  has  led  to  what  Vandergeest  labels 
environmental regulatory networks – a broad interrelated set of state, civil society, and market 
actors that have the common goal of “ … reducing harmful environmental impacts, promoting 
economic  growth,  harmonizing  certification  standards  for  the  purpose  of  facilitating  trade, 
ensuring safe food, protecting domestic industries, and creating new food qualities that can be 
marketed to consumers” [2]. Our analysis distinguishes three intersecting regulatory networks in 
Tarakan, East Kalimantan: 1. WWF-private sector partnerships, 2. government legislation, and 3. 
what Bush and Oosterveer [12] label artisanal trade networks. Linking Tsing’s notion of friction 
to a critical commodity chain approach [see 13], we focus our attention on the ways in which 
actors  in  each  of  these  three  networks  actively  (resisted)  translating  quality  standards  into 
regulatory practices. 
 
Conceptual Framing 
 
Standards and certification have emerged as integral parts of the ‘risk society’, where consumer’s 
concerns  over  food  quality  require  mechanisms  for  assurance  across  globally  spatialized  
markets. Whereas quality was once limited to products, it has now been extended to process, 
including  methods  of  production  and  their  impact  to  (amongst  other  aspects)  environmental 
quality [14]. Standards, and their verification through certification, have therefore transformed 
global agrifood systems by defining a moral economy which regulates “what/who is good and is 
bad and to disciplining those people and things that do not conform to the accepted definition of 
good and bad” [15: 274). This moral dimension of standards and certification has meant that 
initiatives that were once seen as mechanisms to promote safe foods and socially equitable and 
sustainable  production  [16,  17], are  increasingly  seen  as mechanisms  of  marginalization.  As 
outlined by Hatanaka [11] based on work in Indonesia, there are multiple dimensions to this 
failure: the knowledge and practices of farmers are often ignored; there is an unequal division of 
labour and responsibility leading to producer distrust of northern consumers; and the third party 
relations that mediate consumers and producers often confound any mutual understanding or 
moral obligation. 
 
How  standards  and  certification  regulation  is  transferred  and  translated  leads  us  to  a  more 
considered  analysis  of  moral  or  ethical  dimensions  of  environmental  governance  and,  in 
particular, the link to development and equity. Li [18] argues that because expert knowledge is 
transferred through the rationale of ‘improvement programs’, the will of communities to improve 
their  practices is  situated  in  the  field  of  power  related to  the  Foucault’s  governmentality.  If 
governance mechanisms such as standards cannot internalize “educating desires and configuring 
habits, aspiration and beliefs” [18, p. 5], regulatory networks will be limited to the conduct of 
conduct,  rather  than  material  change.  The  implementation  of  standards  and  the  process  of IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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certification is therefore likely to continue face the problems outlined by Hatanaka [11] if there is 
not a meaningful translation of standards into local practices. 
 
A central question is therefore whether and how the translation of standards from the global to 
the local occurs. To unpack this process of translation we use Tsing’s [5] concept of  ‘zones of 
awkward  engagement’  to  understand  how  actors  embedded  in  (environmental)  regulatory 
regulatory networks over shrimp production interpret standards based on their own expectations 
and knowledge. Building on what she calls an ethnography of global connection, Tsing argues 
that  instead  of  seeing  local  communities  as  powerless  minorities  who  have  simply 
accommodated themselves to global forces, she proposes it would be more challenging to see 
global forces as collections of dialectical local/global interactions. This local/global interaction 
produce ‘friction’ within global regulatory networks, which instead of ending in governing the 
conduct of conduct, leads to awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative interconnection across 
difference. By using this lens, we are able to move  beyond conflict and examine how new 
arrangements of culture and power’ emerge. In doing so we can search for innovations within 
environmental regulatory networks as new or hybrid knowledge and practices is created by those 
actors already enrolled in the networks, or perhaps even by those who are not. 
 
The site of friction that we focus on in this paper is the shrimp commodity chain, extending both 
forwards and backwards from the point of production [19]. We use the concept of commodity 
chains as a heuristic to identify key sites of regulation that shape the practice of production and 
flows of inputs and outputs [20]. Vertical commodity flows are also supplemented by complex 
horizontal,  or  networked  connections  of  interdependence  rather  than  fixed,  vertical  and 
unidirectional relationship as promoted by commodity chain analysis [13],  including in the form 
of regulation. In doing so we are able to identify a wider group of actors through the flow of 
shrimp as a commodity and information to those between a diverse set of actors such as research 
and  development,  non-governmental  organization  and  consumer  groups  through  multi-
directional flows of information and materials [21]. Returning to Tsing, commodity chains and 
the regulatory networks that surround them, can therefore be seen as arenas of friction, and hence 
production of new knowledge and practices, as they bring together diverse cultural, economic 
and regulatory paradigms. 
 
Our  analysis  draws  together  commodity  chains  analysis  and  Tsing’s  ethnography  of  global 
connections to examine three related but separate regulatory networks over shrimp production in 
East Kalimantan. The first two are characteristic of horizontal or networked forms of regulation. 
The  first  is  a  traditional  form  of  government  regulation  targeting  processing  companies  and 
producers. The second was set up by WWF in partnership with private processing company and 
the  district  government,  also  promoting  regulation  of  shrimp  production  through  Best 
Management Practice (BMP) standards. Third, we extend this horizontal analysis by returning to 
the commodity chain itself as a regulatory network. Following Bush and Oosterveer [12], we 
examine  whether  and  how  state  and  NGO  networks  interact  with  actors  below  processing 
companies and above producers. Constituting a black box of understanding, we explore whether 
and how these familial and communal actors and networks influence the translation of global and 
national environmental regulation in the local sites.  
 
 IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
  4 
The shrimp chain in Tarakan 
 
A description of the connectivity between the commodity chain and what we define as the thre 
regulatory networks are outlined in Figure 1. The following provides a description of various 
sites along the chain where key contradictions occur around environmental quality and regulation 
are evident.  
 
The chain starts with the brood stock collector who are colleting from the shrimp fishers using 
mini trawls around Tarakan. Those fishers are not specialized in catching the brood stock, but are 
instead opportunistic, keeping and trading brood shrimp if they catch them alive. A brood stock 
collector then travels every day to meet the fishers. As we will see, the large spatial area at which 
these fishers and collectors operate place them largely out the scope of control by both NGO and 
state regulation, but well within marke networks of producers and traders. If there is any issue 
with the quality of the shrimp it is producers and traders that can influence where and how the 
shrimp are caught.  
 
Figure 1. Flow of commodity, regulation, standards and knowledge 
 
 
The key dilemma is that the use of trawlers is banned in Indonesia with the exception of the 
northern  coastal  area  of  East Kalimantan  the  use of  mini  trawls  are  permitted based  on  the 
MMAF regulation issued in 2008 by raising the issue of territoriality [22]. The numbers of this 
fishing  gear  has  increased  year  by  year,  and  by  2007  there  were  approximately  242  boats 
equipped with mini trawl [23]. This has marginalized the shrimp fishers using trammel nets and, 
according to one of the broodstock collectors in Tarakan ads to overexploitation of the wild 
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shrimp populations. For the broodstrock collector, he doesn’t  have any other choice than getting 
the mother shrimp from the mini-trawlers, even though he realize that the quality of mother 
shrimp caught by mini trawl is lower compare to mother shrimp caught by trammel net and that 
the use of the mini-trawl is not an environmental friendly way to caught the shrimp. 
 
The collectors sell the broodstock to hatcheries in Tarakan. Beside facing the trawling problem, 
the brood stock also face the threat of sustainability. After laying the eggs, the common practices 
is that this shrimp will end up in the fry pan. Those two practices are very different to what 
prescribe  by  WWF  in  the  better  management  practices  standards  and  so,  to  fulfill  the 
requirement of an environmentally friendly mother shrimp is almost impossible. Seeking full 
traceability of this part of the chain is also highly challenging given seed is sourced from as far 
away  as  East/Central  Java  and  Sumatra.  Limiting  the  import  of  seed  may  well  enhance  the 
exposure to disease and improve the quality if seed. However, such actions pose an internal 
conflict for the local government who draw considerable tax from this import trade.  
 
The first tambak in Tarakan was opened around 1980’s after which new ponds were opened up 
in Bulungan, Tana Tidung, and Nunukan districts. Most of the tambak were built by opening the 
mangrove forest in te large estuaries along the coast. The boom in opening up tambak took place 
between 1995-2005 with the total increase of tambak area reached 500%. In addition to the high 
global market demand on P. Monodon, the opening of tambak was also promoted through the 
implementation of Presidential decree No. 39/1980 which banned trawling, as well as the high 
incentive  given  by  the  central  government  to  shrimp  farming  through  Intensifikasi  Tambak 
(Tambak intensification, INTAM) programme [24]. A third contributing factor to this expansion 
was the poor local government control over opening new areas for tambak expansion [25].  
 
The scale of tambak in the Tarakan area is relatively unique in Indonesia. Production systems are 
extensive  with  pond  areas  ranging  from  5  to  20  ha.  The  local  of  ponds  in  isolated  delta 
environments coupled with the scale of ponds has given shrimp from Tarakan a reputation of 
being of a higher quality. However, following the trend of shrimp aquaculture in many other 
regions of Southeast Asia production has declined significantly in recent years. How farmers 
have dealt with the increased risk associated with production is directly linked with their access 
to financial capital from middlemen or ponggawa, defined by Levang [26] as “patron[s] who 
provides his client [shrimp farmers] with capital. The capital is generally intended to buy a boat, 
an engine, fishing gear, to develop a tambak or to advance the operating costs for a tambak” [26, 
p. 21]. A farmer’s relationship with middlemen and ponggawa therefore go beyond a source 
credit, to determine whether, how and where they are able to sell their shrimp and for what price. 
In this way, the entire market system in the region is channeled through these individuals. As we 
go to argue, they therefore represent a regulatory system that constitutes a ‘black box’ [12] in 
terms of engaging with formal state and NGO environmental regulatory networks. 
 
While most of the tambak are located in surrounding districts, only accessible by boat, Tarakan 
is the central location of processing companies with 13 our of 7 in East Kalimantan located there. 
A major reason that Tarakan developed as a major centre for processing companies is that it had 
adequate infrastructure for international trading [24] – largely as a result of the long standing oil 
industry on the island. The isolation of ponds in the surrounding districts means that owners live 
in located in Tarakan. This geography means that many of these ‘farmers’ hire someone (usually IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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come with their family) to guard and to manage their farms, removing them from day to day 
farming practices. This has emerged as a key governance issue -  when this come to problem of 
how  to  govern and  who has  the  responsibility to  govern.  The  district  of  Tarakan  could not 
implement their regulations on many farms owned by people in Tarakan because their farms are 
not under their jurisdiction. Because the other districts are more isolated in terms of distances to 
the ponds and they don’t have the cold storages, and therefore not the same financial incentive as 
Tarakan, they have not invested in promoting or supporting regulation.  
 
The biggest buyer for the shrimp produced in Tarakan is Japan. They prefer Japan because they 
perceive their requirements and standards on quality as lower.  
 
Government regulation of the fish chain 
 
The  state  has  been  active  in  regulating  food  safety  and  environmental  quality  through  a 
combination  of  standards  and  regulations.  However,  as  indicated  in  Figure  1,  much  of  the 
attention of government regulation has been given to processing companies. Only recently the 
government has tried to regulate the producers through the certification of farm level national 
good aquaculture practices (CBIB). While the government has been effective as a producer of 
regulation,  it  has  been  less  effective  in  enforcement.  Regulating  processing  companies  and 
producers  also  appears  to  have  reified  the  limited  regulation  of  the  chain  of  custody,  most 
notably those actors above producers and below processors.  
 
The ability of the government to regulate different actors in the shrimp chain contrasts markedly. 
In an attempt to regulate producers, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) has 
developed a national certification on good aquaculture practices and a National Residue Control 
Plan (NRCP) based on the demands of the EU. Even though those two programs are already 
operational they have not been yet extended to parts of Indonesia. The reasons behind this as 
stated by the MMAF officers (during the seminar program held by Wageningen UR and MMAF, 
Wageningen, 21 April 2010) are a lack of qualified laboratory tools, the technical inputs required 
to run this system are very expensive and the government lacks qualified operators. However, 
regulation  of  processors  has  proven  more  effective  with  processing  feasibility  certification, 
HACCP,  and  national  health  certificate,  issued  by  the  national  level  laboratories  already  a 
mandatory requirement of operation. 
 
Only recently the central government started to see the opportunity to apply the national Good 
Aquaculture Practices certification in Tarakan. In January 2010 the central government sent their 
auditor to check the possibility of the shrimp farms to be certified in the region. The result of the 
audit was, despite high hopes for more sustainable shrimp production in Tarakan, most of the 
farms earmarked for certification were advised they require improvement. Three main issues for 
compliance posed by the auditor include the shape of tambak, mangrove around the pond and 
sanitation problems. However, it appears that standards are even open to interpretation by those 
who are involved in regulating them. During the meeting it was noted that the shape of tambak 
and the planting of mangroves are not stated directly in the guidance book of good aquaculture 
practices. Instead they were communicated through a pictorial demonstration of a BMP farm 
which illustrated  ponds as being a maximum of 2 ha in area and square, just like the ponds in 
Java or Sulawesi. IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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In the national good aquaculture practices (CBIB) the layout and design of a ‘good’ pond is 
explained in detail. The main objective of these standards is to prevent the contamination caused 
by  either disease or waste disposal. The government through the inspector teams have been 
asking farmers to reshape and resize their tambak to conform the standards. Most farmers are 
unable to accept these regulations because of cost. But perhaps more importantly, they don’t 
accept the standards because they fundamentally disagree with the methods they promote in the 
context of Tarakan. As one farmer outlined: 
 
“We can not built a nice hut in the pond area. If needed, the farmers should act if they are poor to 
avoid  the  robber.  But,  the  problem  is  that  those  people  [representative  of  MMAF]  do  not 
understand the pond [system] in Tarakan. They question the shape of the tambak … I explained to 
them that this is what we called traditional tambak in Tarakan. It’s extensive and needs a lot of 
area. But, this is more sustainable in production compare to intensive which is high in production 
but only for short term.” (Leader of informal shrimp farmer association, Tarakan, 2010)  
 
The  concerns  of  this  one  farmer  are  echoed  by  many  others  interviewed  and  reflect  a 
fundamental difference in opinion about what is possible given the farming conditions in the 
Tarakan region. This is not to reify the notion that ‘farmers know best’. Instead it demonstrates 
how the marginalization of farmers knowledge in setting up standards leads to epistemological 
conflicts over what defines sustainability. 
 
Standards have become a mechanism of the government to ‘conduct the conduct’ of farmers by 
educating and configuring desires, habits, aspirations and beliefs. In response, the farmers argue 
that the government is trying to intervene at so large a distance that, reflecting the finding of Li,  
they “are not necessarily aware of how their conduct is being conducted or why” [18, p. 4]. So 
far,  government  has  seen  shrimp  farmers  as  a  target  of  standard  implementation  rather  than 
incorporating them directly in standard development, monitoring and enforcement [cf. 2; 11]. All 
the  certification  and  standards  adopt  the  market  demands  and  are  under  central  government 
authority and supervision. Beside having a role as regulator, the central government also plays 
the role as auditor which is sometimes not accompanyed by an adequate technical assistance. It 
seems  that  the  role  of  government  is  being  supplemented  by  ‘environmental  regulatory 
networks’, which, as described by Vandergeest, are “an approach to environmental governance 
and locates certification in relation to a broader approach to environmental governance” [2, p 
1154].  
 
Introduction  of  the  Better  Management  Practices:  the  Emerging  of  Environmental 
Regulatory networks  
 
In  April  2008,  WWF  Indonesia,  Mustika  Minanusa  Aurora  (MMA-one  of  the  biggest  cold 
storage in Tarakan) and Environment and Natural Resources Agency of Tarakan signed an MoU 
on mangrove rehabilitation in Tarakan Area. Within 3 years, MMA assisted by WWF have a 
responsibility to plant 150 ha of mangrove in 5 years. WWF in turn has used the arrangement to 
introduce better management practices to the farmers attached to MMA. This initiative aims to 
develop  better  aquaculture  practices  in  shrimp  farming  to  minimize  the  negative  impacts  of 
shrimp farming on the environment, including the use of chemical substance, mangrove cutting, 
use  of  artificial  feed,  and  the  use  of non-environmental-friendly-caught   brood  stock.  WWF IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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advertise their BMP manual as having been developed through a multi-stakeholder dialogue, 
involving    shrimp  farmers,  government,  cold  storage,  shrimp  collector,  hatcheries  and  the 
university  (personal communication WWF), and subsequent farm trials. 
 
The BMPs stipulate that the location to build tambak should be based on the national planning 
and legal frameworks for environmentally suitable locations. One of the standards determines 
that the construction of tambak should not destroy or harvest vegetations inside 150 m “green-
belt-zone”, but for farmers there is no clear definition of what this green belt constitutes. All of 
the farmers interviewed interpret this standards as “tambak should be built 150 meters from the 
river banks”. As one farmer states, this is problematic and does not match with current practices:  
 
“I attended the meeting of WWF couple of time. We were discussing about which areas are 
allowed for  building a tambak … According to them, we have to build tambak at least 150 
meters from the river banks. This does not make sense. It’s too far. Thirty meters from the river 
banks is already to far for us. That’s the maximum for us, tambak should be located 30 meters 
from the river banks” (Farmer, Pegat-Batumbuk village, 2010) 
 
A major source of skepticism is derived from the fact that The BMP manual guidance that was 
presented during the Tarakan BMP meeting was from those WWF had already developed for 
Aceh. During the meeting, the facilitator continued to remind the participants at the time that that 
this manual was only an example, and that an adapted set of BMPs would be designed northern 
coast of East Kalimantan. However, most of the farmers continued to question the applicability 
of the standards which they believed would be the basis for regulation in Tarakan:  
 
 “If you show this standards to farmers, they will laugh at them. We never do this kind of thing. If 
you want us to practice these standards, you have to show us how to do it. Not just telling us what 
we should do and what we should not do. If you can show us that your way is better in increasing 
the production, or at least to make the production stable, I am sure that farmers here will follow 
you voluntarily” (Shrimp farmer, Tarakan, 2010) 
 
Both WWF and central government, are trying to govern the farmers using what Li [18] refers to 
as  “distinctive  means”.  As  seen  with  government  regulation,  the  WWF  standards  are  very 
focused on getting farmers to comply with on farm regulation and trying to discipline farmers to 
practice  in  a  certain  way.  So  far,  the  process  of  implementation  has  not  reflected  farmer’s 
concerns, nor has so far failed in providing any substantive transfer of knowledge, especially in 
terms  of  technical  assistance  on  how  farmers  should  actually  convert  their  ponds  to  ‘best 
practice’. This is not to say WWF has not tried. They did establish a two demonstration ponds in 
Tarakan and implemented mangrove planting around the ponds dike, building a water settlement 
pond, and using ‘organic’ in place of chemical antibiotics, such as Saponin. Unfortunately these 
ponds are bare little resemblance to the ponds in Tarakan, and are located in an area with poor 
water quality. Not only did the farmers remain skeptical that the measures were appropriate for 
their own farms, the demonstration ponds have returned only very low production, and in some 
cycles failed all together.  
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The ‘black box’ – bringing ponggawa and shrimp collectors in or leaving them out  
 
This section will discuss the role of pongawa and the shrimp collectors who have been ignored 
by the government and global governance as the important actor in the process of knowledge 
transfer, not just an important actor in the process of commodity transfer. As stated by Levang 
[26] the link between cold storage companies to ponggawa and shrimp farmers is incredibly 
efficient, based on a network with a strong cohesion because the links between the different 
levels of the network are not only commercial. Despite their importance in the functioning of the 
shrimp industry in Tarakan they remain poorly understood and outside of the control of state and 
non  state  regulators.  In  this  way  they  constitute  the  ‘black  box’  of  artisanal  trade  networks 
identified by Bush and Oosterveer [12]. We argue this holds considerable implications for the 
governance of shrimp, especially governance related to market based standards and traceability.  
 
Ponggawa hold control over the activities of farmers as they direct the flow of knowledge and 
economic incentives for farming activities. As middlemen they buy shrimp from diverse sources, 
both ponds and capture fisheries. They determine the price of shrimp based on a mix of quasi-
credit relations, or debt-tied pricing mechanisms rather than market prices. Given many have 
enough capital to work independently from processing companies they are free to steer shrimp to 
any of the processing companies. From the other side, they are also highly valuable associates of 
the processing companies given they take a distributive role as well as a large degree of risk in 
purchases – an especially important function given the large distances shrimp are traded across 
the Tarakan region. The precarious role of these ponggawa was outlined by the director of a 
processing factory as follows: 
 
“Agents  [shrimp  collector]  are  more  respected  by  the  farmers  …  Different  to  us;  we’re  a 
company. [The fishermen, shrimp farmer] think that we’re rich so … they think  if they cheat, 
[the company]  is still ok. So the agent maybe know very well how to communicate with the 
shrimp farmers, using this family relations. For example, if I am an agent I will know the father or 
the brother of the farmers connected to me … but for the company, it’s difficult to do that”. 
(Processing company director, 17 February 2009) 
 
If the processing companies were to deal directly with the farmers they would have to provide 
credit for stocking. Based on experience, the companies see this as too high risk – often farmers 
do not pay money back and there is little recourse to demand payments. This is largely because 
their relation is purely business, with no social leverage as a guarantee to financial security. This 
In comparison, Pongawa are embedded within the familial and social relations of their client – 
the  farmers  –  which  provides  substantial  security  to  their  business  activities.  As  companies 
cannot, and it appears do not want to fill this role the role of the ponggawa is not exploitative, 
but rather an important function in facilitating the shrimp chain. 
 
Farmers relationships with the ponggawa is also strategic. Most of shrimp farmers in Tarakan 
don’t have adequate financial capital for their activities and rely on ponggawa to assist with 
financial and material capital. The assistance usually comes in supply of fry and financial credit 
for the production costs. In return the ponggawa secures their supply of shrimp as, farmers are 
bound to sell their shrimp to the source of their credit or fry. Farmers also make use of this 
relationship  if  they  are  in  need  of  any  further  emergency  funding.  The  intricacies  of  the 
relationship were referred to by one ponggawa as follows: IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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“I don’t have any ties with the farmers. The farmers have ties with me because I give them 
[material and financial] capital. From seed to money … those shrimp farmers, they are smart. If 
they know that I got a benefit from the trade, they will come to me and ask for credit. If I don’t 
give them the money, they will sell their shrimps to other agent in the next harvesting time” 
(Shrimp collector, Tarakan 17 January 2010) 
 
Coming back to Figure 1, we argue that important position of ponggawa and shrimp collectors to 
both  farmers  and  processing  companies  has  been  largely  ignored  by  state  and  non  state 
regulatory networks. Up to this point they have been largely untouched by national regulations 
and standards, and as such, any  transfer of knowledge. This raises important questions. If the 
ponggawa  are  so  intrical  to  the  shrimp  system, and  especially shrimp  trade,  should  they  be 
meaningfully included into the formal regulatory networks. If they control flows of information 
and  incentives then their inclusion appears to be imperative. They are also imperative to any 
plans to create a coherent traceability system, but have so far been ignored by the government. 
They have also not been included in the WWF stakeholder discussions, even though informally, 
they acknowledge the important position of the ponggawa and shrimp collector. This appears to 
particularly demonstrate the hard boundary that still exists between global and local, formal and 
informal networks, and as such any chance of a meaningful translation of knowledge between 
these scales.  
 
Discussion  
 
Our results indicate that the standardization of shrimp production is a highly negotiated process. 
As standards are developed through national and global networks distant cultures are imposed on 
local practices. Those standards are alien to the farmers since they are, most of the time, bringing 
a completely different understanding/scheme to the farmers daily practice. The friction comes as 
the attempt of the farmers to translate and negotiate those standards into and with their daily 
practice. Friction is clearly evident when farmers see don’t know advantage to comply with those 
standards.  
 
The goal of the standards is to standardize the differences in the practices of farmers [15] and to 
improve, as stated by Li [18] “deficiencies that need to be rectified”. But, as Li continues to 
argue, there is a risk that the global experts who are prescribe improvements that exclude the 
structure of political-economic relation from their diagnosis and prescriptions are unlikely to be 
successful. These experts, in this case WWF in collaboration with the coldstorage company as 
the global governance and the central government exclude ponggawa and shrimp collectors in 
their prescriptions. Whereas, in the chain of commodity, those two actors are also the important 
actors in the process of commodity transfer and that these two actors consider as the important 
one to the company and farmers. In order to achieve the goal in whatever the prescription is, this 
two actors should be considered as one of the ‘deficiency that need to be rectified’. We could not 
just kick them out and dispel them from the chain 
 
This black box created by the flow of regulation, standard and transfer of knowledge also putting 
out the existence of the ponggawa and shrimp collectors as the important actors to smoothing out 
the transfer of knowledge from above down to the farmers. Socially, they have a very strong 
position, both to the company and farmers. Company already use the existence of ponggawa and IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
  11 
collectors as the informal quality control by translated the standards demand through the shrimp 
classification of  ‘export quality shrimp’ and ‘non-export quality shrimp’. To the farmers, these 
terms and condition are more effective than the standards introduced by the two other regulatory 
networks since those two actors who related directly with the farmers in the flow of commodity.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Our findings indicate that although standards could be a very effective way to conduct farmer’s 
conduct, they are prepared without any involvement of the targeted group in Tarakan. Instead 
they are largely expert driven standards transferred from the international or national scale to 
Tarakan. This has meant that the requirements of the standard to be met by the farmers contrast 
to local conditions and practices. This does not mean that farmers know best, but rather questions 
whether and how processes of standardization should aspire to regulate uniformity. The unique 
nature of Tarakan makes this all the  more pertinent. Our  results demonstrate how standards 
developed in both national and international, state and non state regulatory networks, are not 
transliterated  ‘word  for  word’,  but  instead  are  interpreted  according  to  the  knowledge  and 
expectations  of  local  actors.  How  this  interpretation  proceeds  a  major  determinant  of  the 
acceptance or refutation of regulation.   
 
The second proposition we address is that to make the implementation of those standards to be 
more effective and to make it become knowledgably to the farmers, governance arrangements 
could make use the existence of the ponggawa and shrimp collector. The central position of these 
chain actors in the transfer of knowledge to the farmers makes them an essential node in what 
constitutes a poorly understood ‘third’ regulatory network. The relation between ponggawa and 
shrimp collector and farmers are not just only a business matter. The ponggawa and shrimp 
collector are the patron to the farmers [26]. Different to the relation of the company and farmers 
which  is  purely  business.  And  that,  to  the  farmers,  the  government  is  nowhere.  Since  the 
complicated situation of the who should be the ‘governor’, leave the farmers without any field 
assistance.  
 
Instead of passively receiving regulation that are prescribed and imposed on them, farmers are 
active in translating and negotiating standards. The process of translation and negotiation occur 
at every stages of the chain by all actors creating a new ‘culture’ of regulation, compliance and 
environmental outcomes. This new ‘culture’ is also characterized by the interaction of the local 
actors in the chain. The strong social position of the ponggawa and shrimp collector make them 
as the middlemen actor in the process of the translation and negotiation of the standards and 
certification from the above of the chain to the down of the chain.  
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